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Studies on Asia

“Malcontent Koreans (Futei Senjin)”:

Towards a Genealogy of Colonial
Representation of Koreans in the Japanese
Empire*
Jinhee Lee
Eastern Illinois University
[H]istory…teaches us that domination breeds resistance, and that the
violence inherent in the imperial contest…is an impoverishment for both
sides.1
“Empire” is a relationship, and the enterprise of empire—formal or
informal—depended in many ways upon the idea of having an
empire. 2 Meiji Japan (1868-1912) began to penetrate the politics,
economy, and culture of Korea in the late nineteenth century. 3
However, by the early twentieth century, it was not only the Japanese
* I would like to thank Tim Engles, Ron Toby, Nancy Abelmann, Antoinette
Burton, and Song Jiang for their valuable comments in various stages of developing
this paper. I am grateful for the opportunities that I had to share my thoughts in
this paper at the following venues during the past several years: Midwest
Conference on Asian Affairs, Midwest Japan Seminar, Calvin College, University of
Southern California, the University of Illinois, the Association for Asian Studies
annual meeting, and Eastern Illinois University. The grants for my follow-up
summer research travel to Japan and Korea have been provided by the generous
support of the Northeast Asia Council of AAS and the National Museum of
Japanese History (Rekihaku). Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to
Nakama Keiko at Liberty Osaka, Mizuta Museum, Hakudō family, Reconstruction
Memorial Hall, Rekihaku, Yamada Shōji, Kang Tŏk-sang, and Tanaka Masataka for
their research support for the project.
1

Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), 288.

2

Ibid., 9-11.

For an analysis of Japanese political and economic intrusion into Korea at the
turn of the twentieth century, see Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese
Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
3
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metropole that penetrated the colonies; the colonized Koreans had
penetrated the metropole as well. This context of Japan’s colonial
expansion into Korea prompted a large scale population movement
and frequent contact between Japanese and Koreans, especially
following Japan’s unequal treaty with Korea (1876), subsequent wars
with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) over its interest in
Korea, and eventual formal colonization of Korea (1910). It is also
this background against which many Koreans were brought to the
Japanese metropole during the early years of Japan’s empire-building
process.4 Since then the Korean community in Japan has never been
free from the influence of colonialism and imperialism, nor the
Japanese have in their relation to the colonized. Therefore, what we
see in the quotidian lives of those who lived in Japanese naichi (inner
lands or Japan proper) is not only the material impact of increased
political and economic exchange with the gaichi (outer lands or
Japan’s colonies), but also the psychological and cultural effects of
having an empire.5
In particular, as the number of Koreans grew in the
metropole, the presence of the colonized began to matter to Japanese
more and more, not only in a remote and abstract sense, but tangible

Important earlier works on the subject of the Korean community in Japan include
Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1967); Changsoo Lee and George DeVos, Koreans in Japan: Ethnic
Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981);
Michael A. Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910-1923 (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989).
4

For example, the idea of having a colony in Northeast China made a tremendous
domestic impact in the Japanese metropole. For further discussion, see Louise
Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1999).
5
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and practical. 6 And, having to justify and maintain the hierarchical
relationship between the two people, the images of Koreans as
immature and uncivilized—and thus in need of Japan’s “assistance”
for their successful “assimilation” to the colonial master—were
widely propagated by the colonial bureaucrats and ordinary Japanese
alike. 7 At the same time, the images of vengeful Koreans haunted
their minds as it became increasingly difficult to distinguish Koreans
from Japanese, not to mention distinguishing “bad” Koreans from
“good” Koreans. Theses ambiguities frustrated many in the
metropole, from children to intelligence officers, who sought to
discern so-called “enemies from within.” How, then, the differences
between Koreans and Japanese were observed, imagined, and iterated
in colonial discourse? What kind of racial imaginary was constructed
and circulated, and by whom? How did Koreans appear in
government documents and mass media in the Japanese metropole?
In what ways were these mechanisms of colonial representations
appeared and proliferated?
Curiously enough, unlike in studies of European empires, the
issue of race and racialized representations of the colonized within
Asian empires have not received sufficient attention until recently, as
in the case of the Japanese empire. 8 What was the relationship
For a study on the ways in which Japanese settlers in Korea negotiated in this
process of Japan’s colonial expansion, see Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese
Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1868-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia
Center, 2011).
6

For the numerous assimilation policies of Japan to integrate the Korean people
as Japanese and their ultimate failure for the goals, see Mark Caprio, Japanese
Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington Press, 2009).
7

I would like to thank Chris Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, the directors of the
project on "The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race under Empire,"
which gave me a valuable opportunity for stimulating dialogue on the subject
8
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between race and empire in the case of imperial Japan which had
similar looking Asians both as the colonizer and colonized? As the
political economy of Japanese naichi and Korean gaichi became
intertwined rapidly after the late nineteenth century, and while
Koreans were hurriedly “catching up” with the “modern” lifestyle by
emulating it as it was often interpreted by Japanese, Koreans
exhibited little or no visible physical differences that were easily
distinguishable from those of the Japanese. Although there were
differences in degree depending on their class and gender identities,
an undeniably increasing number of Koreans began to have similar
outer appearance as the Japanese as Koreans adopted and shared
more and more of the fashion and hairstyle of the metropole. The
dilemma that Imperial Japan had to face, then, was how to identify
the “inferior” elements of the empire’s subjects that were physically
invisible, and preach to discipline and assimilate them while
simultaneously keeping them inferior for the purpose of maintaining
the hierarchical order in the empire.
In this paper, by placing the Japanese discourse of colonial
representatioans of Koreans at the intersection of the racial and
cultural politics of an empire-building process in Asia, I will explore
the ways in which racialized Korean Others were differentiated in the
context of the Japanese empire. In particular, I trace the genealogy of
“malcontent Koreans” (J. futei senjin; K. pullyŏng sŏnin)—one of the
most frequently appearing idioms used to represent the colonized
matter in its first workshop at Dartmouth College in 2009. For recent parallel
studies of the struggle of the Japanese and U.S. empires in managing racialized
populations in the context of total war, see Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans
as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2011). For a related discussion on the assimilation of colonized
Taiwanese to Japanese and their colonial identity formations and transformations in
the Japanese empire, see Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the
Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
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Koreans in Japanese official documents and popular media—in the
context of Japan’s growing colonial expansion into Korea. For this
purpose, I will explore the ways in which the phrase “malcontent
Koreans” emerged, spread, and became ubiquitous in Japanese
official and popular discourses during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. As I analyze how this particular image of Koreans
in the Japanese metropole exemplified the constructed and
contradictory nature of colonial relation and representations, I argue
that how such representation of Koreans was the manifestation of
inherent fear of the colonized in the mind of the colonizer. I will next
examine how such fear among the colonizer contributed to one of
the most brutal massacres of the colonized by the authorities and
ordinary citizens alike following the Great Kantō Earthquake in
Japan in 1923.
Through the examination, I argue that, first, the emergence
and consequences of the futei senjin discourse in the Japanese
metropole—whether it concerns the fear, rumor, or the massacre—
must be understood primarily in the context of Japan’s intensifying
colonialism in Korea. Second, Koreans’ resilient resistance against
Japan’s imperial aggression in Korea in and beyond Korean territory
proliferated widespread fear of the colonized among the Japanese,
and had profound effects on the colonial policies as well as the
ordinary Japanese people’s conceptions of Koreans in the metropole.
Third, the moments of mass-scale political crisis that Japan faced in
its dealings with Koreans, such as the 1919 March First Independent
Movement in colonial Korea and the 1923 massacre of Koreans in
the Japanese metropole, were not just aberrational, trivial, and
inconvenient “episodes” concerning the colonized, but reflection of
the pervasive tension and instability of an empire which could not be
resolved easily.9 And finally, it is my contention that the fear of futei
Unlike many official and popular narratives’ treatment of the mayhem, I refuse to
take the 1923 massacre of Koreans as one of the many unfortunate, “indispensable
(yamuoezu) disturbances (sawagi)” or “episodes” over Koreans (Chōsenjin) in the
9
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senji, a powerful and convenient taxonomy of colonial representation,
obscured the ways in which these important moments of colonial
violence were reported, registered, and narrated in official and
popular discourses, thus resulting in justifying the mass killing with
impunity and solidifying the exclusionary, ethnically defined
boundary between the “Japanese public” and racialized Korean
others. It is for these reasons that the genealogy of futei senjin needs to
be squarely put in the context of the Japanese empire historicizing
and contextualizing who those malcontent were, and the massacre
must be revisited and rearticulated clarifying why they were killed, by
whom, and how.
In these ways, the genealogy of colonial representation of
Koreans in the name of futei senjin illuminates the intertwined realms
of the linguistic, political, cultural, and most importantly, ethical
practices in the multiethnic Japanese empire. It also exemplifies the
arbitrary and ambivalent nature of colonial discourse in articulating
the “differences” of the racialized others, as it ironically coexisted
with the simultaneous rhetoric of assimilation. And the persistence of
the particular logic behind the formation and maintenance of the
discourse of futei senjin sheds light on the context in which Japan
eventually set its path toward the doomed fate of colonialism and
militarism into the 1930s and thereafter.

midst of the post-quake confusion. Instead, I call it “the Kantō Massacre” (Kantō
daigyakusatsu), rather than the conventional name of the event, “the massacre of
Koreans during the Great Kantō Earthquake” (Kantō daishinsai ji no Chōsenjin
gyakusatsu), to highlight the importance of the colonial relations and representations
behind the cause for the massacre, and not the earthquake itself. I share with Kang
(1975, 2003), Chōng (2011), and Kim (1994) that, this way, the large scale of the
collective violence as well as the systematic ways in which Koreans were identified
and targeted for the pogrom by the authorizes and citizens alike come alive for
better understanding of the historical event.
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Fear, In/visible Bodies, and the Problem of Koreans in the
Japanese Empire
“Enlightenment” thinking and “scientific” knowledge became
powerful tools in the emergence and spread of a number of modern
empires. Observation—supposedly objective and neutral—was the
method of the era, and thanks to the accumulated empirical data on
the materiality and the groups under their control, empires could
benefit from such constructed “knowledge,” which became crucial in
the maintenance and expansion of their colonial rhetoric as well as
day-to-day operation. If the concept of “race” emerged and spread
along with the practice of racism, it also provided a convenient tool
to categorize human beings into biologically and genetically distinct
groups in the process of producing specific “knowledge” on the
subjugated Others. The assumption behind the construct of “race”
was that distinct physical features were observable, recognizable, and
could explain certain cultural, mental, and even moral behaviors of
the targeted people. Such beliefs established a hierarchical distinction
between “civilized” and “primitive” based on particular articulations
on physical features of the racialized Others. Such rhetoric also
justified the imperial businesses of subjugating and “enlightening” the
colonized, who were degenerate and inferior to the observing eyes in
the context of the spread of colonialism. While preaching the
missions of “civilization and enlightenment” through “assimilation,”
colonial masters employed various imperial projects which implied
racial hierarchy, bringing forth cultural effects of colonial relations and
representation in the context of multiracial empires.10
The concept of “assimilation,” by its nature, assumes
differences between the involved groups and therefore accompanies
inherent “tension between notions of incorporation and
For further theoretical discussion and a case study of the epistemological effects
of colonial representations, see Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge:
The British in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1996.
10
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differentiation.” 11 Therefore, unsurprisingly, assimilationist rhetoric
had long been “compromised by the need to maintain distinctions
against a colonized population.” 12 In the context of European
colonial expansion into Africa and the Americas, the colonized
bodies became crucial sites for imperial inscription of coloniality as
they exhibited readily visible signs of physical differences. Their skin
color, facial features, and hair type, for example, were important
means to develop and reinforce prejudices against the subjugated.
Particular cultural and political meanings were written and read in the
bodily “evidence” of the colonized in constructing social taxonomies
of convenience. As a result, “how a person was labeled could
determine that a certain category of persons could be killed or raped
with impunity, but not others,” thus justifying “specific forms of
violence at specific times” based on such classification of human
beings.13
However, such an understanding of colonial racialization
raises a question: what happens, then, when the colonized bodies do
not seem to exhibit any conveniently recognizable physical signs of
difference, as in the case of Koreans in the early twentieth-century
Japanese empire? How can a multiethnic empire of the modern era,
which relies on mass production, mass consumption, mass politics,
and mass culture, carry out cultural engineering for mass mobilization
while maintaining hierarchical distinctions between the colonizer and
colonized? What kinds of articulation of such indistinguishable
bodies of the colonized arose in the service of empire? What became
Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Introduction," in Tensions of Empire:
Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press,1997), 10.
11

12

Stoler and Cooper, 22.

13

Stoler and Cooper, 6.
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the criteria to discern such invisible bodily differences?
Being able to identify those deemed dangerous and rebellious
against the maintenance of the “public” peace and order was a critical
matter for the early years of Japan’s expansion into its resistant
neighbor. In fact, Japanese imperial intelligence officers were keenly
aware of this problem from early on, and were instructed to carry
around an official manual to distinguish the physical features of
“malcontent Koreans” from Japanese. What kind of differences were
observed or imagined in the minds of Japanese in the metropole?
How did the lack of discernible physical differences affect the
colonial discourse of the cultural and historical gap that must exist
between the dominant and the subjugated? Now I turn to the specific
ways in which the futei senjin discourse emerged during the early years
of Japanese colonial rule of Korea to demonstrate the power of
fear—and the irony of it—which urged Japanese bureaucrats and
ordinary people alike to look for visible signs of physical differences
to “embody” the Korean enemy within the metropole.
What’s Petty and What’s Political: The Taxonomies of Senjin
and Futei
Senjin (鮮人), along with Senmin (鮮民), was a denigrated short form
of Chōsenjin (朝鮮人), which began to appear to address Koreans
publicly in Japan since the time of Japan’s annexation of Korea in
1910, following the frequent use of the term employed by the
colonial government officials.14 Prior to formal colonization, Korea
According to the annexation-related document by Terauchi Chōsen sōtoku hōkoku
Kankoku heigō shimatsu (November 9, 1910), the titles of the Korean nation (国号)
and its emperor (皇帝の尊稱) were the two most contentious issues between
Terauchi and Yi Wanyong in their negotiation over the terms of the annexation.
The final compromise resulted in the use of the name of the country from the days
of Korean subordination to China, Chosŏn, while changing the Korean emperor’s
title to wang which is a “king” rather than an emperor. The original annexation
document is available at the Japanese National Archive (Kokuritsu kōbunshokan)
14
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was referred to as Kankoku (Hanguk in K, 韓 国 ) based on the
country’s official name, the Great Han Empire ( 大韓帝國; Dai Kan
teikoku). Consequently, the people of Korea were referred to as
Kankokumin (韓国民), Kanmin (韓民), Kankokujin (韓国人), or Kanjin
(韓人) in Japanese official documents during the first decade of the
twentieth century, while Chōsenjin also appeared in print media such
as newspapers and magazines. However, after the formalization of
Korea’s status as an official colony of Japan in the summer of 1910,
Senjin or Senmin along with Chōsenjin became the most frequently used
title for Koreans both by the authorities and in popular media, which
many of the colonized disliked due to the denigrated and pejorative
nuance that these terms carried. For example, the Governer-General
Terauchi began his rule in Korea by addressing the people of the
newly acquired Japanese territory as Senjin, a homonym for the term
“lowly people” (賎人) or outcasts (賎民) at a public meeting before
his colonial bureaucrats and officials in the fall of 1910.15 By such a
title, Koreans were reminded of their lowly sociopolitical position visà-vis the Japanese under Japan’s political, economic, and military
control of Korea.
According to Nihon kokugo daijiten by Shōgakukan, the history
behind the usage of the term futei (不逞) goes back to the year of 718.
Various Japanese dictionaries indicate that the literal meaning of the
and Kyujanggak Archive in Seoul. For further discussion on the issue, see Kŭm
Pyŏngdong, ed. Shiryō zasshi ni miru kindai Nihon no Chōsen ninshiki 1 Kankoku heigō ki
zengo (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1999), 547-574.
“Chōsen no ryūkōgo,” Chōsen kōron 12 (December 1913): 67-68. According to an
Asami Rintarō, Senjin might have come from a short form of Nissenjin (Japanese
and Koreans) which gradually replaced Nikkanjin as Japan’s annexation of Korea
caused the change of name back to its old name Chosŏn. Therefore, Asami argued
that the term Senjin or Senmin did not necessarily contain any negative meaning.
Senmin also appears in a classical Confucian text Analects which means “little one.”
15
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term includes “wrong in behavior;” 16 “complaining, disobedient,
brazen, doing things as one pleases;”17 or “insubordinate, recalcitrant,
outlawry, refractory, malcontent, and rebellious.”18 In Meiji Japan, an
official police document The 1895 Index of Important Police Duties
(Keisatsu yōmu mokuroku) includes controlling (torishimaru) the crimes
under the category of futei as one of the core duties of the police
force. 19 However, the recorded crimes under futei torishimari in this
police manual indicate a group of relatively petty unlawful behaviors
such as fraud and robbery, rather than top-class political or
ideological crimes against the government or the emperor. Neither
the document seems to indicate any particularly close connection
between futei crimes and Koreans as of the late nineteenth century.
When, then, were these two terms, futei and senjin, combined
to become one set phrase? Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
socialist movements became increasingly visible in Japan amidst
rising consciousness concerning various “social problems” (shakai
mondai). 20 Their activities and publications addressed practical
concerns for the oppressed, often challenging the authorities. In
response, the government began surveillance on the activities of
these first generation Japanese socialists, starting from the very
16

Dai nihon tosho kokugo jiten (Dainihon tosho)

17

Kōjien (Iwanami)

18

New Japanese-English Dictionary (Kenkyūsha)

19

Keishichō, Keisatsu yōmu mokuroku (Tokyo, 1895), 53.

For example, the Socialism Study Group (Shakaishugi kenkyūkai) was formed in
1898, which took the new name of Socialism Association (Shakaishugi kyōkai) by
1900, and Socialist Democratic Party (Shakai minshu tō) was established only a year
later. The Commoners’ Society (Heiminsha) was formed in Tokyo by 1903, which
began its weekly journal Heimin shinbun providing a space for the early socialists to
discuss various social problems including labor, urban, and rural problems.
20

127

Series IV, Volume 3, No. 1, March 2013

beginning years of the twentieth century. The result was the official
publication of The History of Socialists (Shakaishugisha shi), which first
appeared in 1908, a confidential document for internal use that later
became a periodic governmental publication under the new title,
Information on the Matters of Special Blacklist Figures (Tokubetsu yōshisatsu
jōsei ippan).
Subsequently, anti-governmental non-conformers were
entered into the blacklist and became major targets of systematic,
routine government surveillance. The mass arrest of such dissidents
manifested in the High Treason Incident of 1910, which resulted in
the death sentences of twelve leading anarchists and socialists. The
shocking case was followed by the establishment of the Special
Higher Police (Tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu) the following year within the
Tokyo Metropolitan Police (Keishichō) under the direct control of the
Ministry of Home Affairs. This was a specialized police unit for
thought control, especially targeting those blacklisted figures of
socialists, communists, anarchists, and now Koreans, who were
considered a threat to public order. Afterward, publications and
activities deemed to be against the authority of the government or the
emperor came under tight state surveillance and censorship.
As early as the turn of the nineteenth century, Japan’s
imperialist expansion met the formidable challenge of the Korean
resistance. As Japan’s aggression toward Korea became apparent
through the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) and the RussoJapanese War (1904-1905), the persistent armed struggle by the
Korean Righteous Army (ŭibyŏng) 21 against the Japanese military
The etymology of the term ŭibyŏng and their anti-Japanese resistance can be
traced back to the Japanese invasion of Korea led by Toyotomi Hideyoshi during
the last decade of the sixteenth century. But the organized military resistance
movement against Japanese aggression in modern Korea began during the last
decade of the nineteenth century following the Kabo Peasants Movement and the
assassination of the Queen of Korea by pro-Japanese cliques in 1895, which was
fueled by the forced dissolution of the Korean military force by Japan in 1907.
21
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weakened the authority and legitimacy of Japan to intervene in and
control Korean matters. Although Japan put over 5,200 police forces
and 6,000 military police forces in Korea, beginning in June of 1910,
in preparation for the “smooth” annexation of Korea, the number of
the Righteous Army grew during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. They resisted Japan’s protectorate-ship over Korea
against its sovereignty (1905-1910), the forced abdication of the
Korean king Kojong, and the dismissal of the Korean military.
Therefore, putting such armed resistance in Korea under control
became one of the top priorities for the imperial government as well
as the Governor-General of Korea (GGK) during the first two
decades of the twentieth century.22 In addition, to the extent that the
majority of such organized armed struggle was forced to move
abroad to the border area between Korea and China through harsh
military subjugation, Japan’s suppression of it was a “success” soon
after the formal annexation of Korea in 1910.
While many Koreans called resisting Koreans the “Righteous
Army,” Japanese imperial and colonial authorities, newspapers, and
magazines often referred to them as “rioters” or “violent mob” (暴
徒；bōto) or a small number of malcontents (少数の不逞の徒; shōsū
no futei no yakara). By also calling them vulgar and wild thieves or
robbers, the colonial authorities sought to trivialize the existence of
such organized Korean opposition to its colonial master. For
example, the secretary of the Ch'ungch'ŏng Province local
government in Korea said that the majority of these “rioters” were in
fact not a violent mob against Japan, but the fools who were

For example, according to Chōsen bōto tōbatsu shi (1913), a record of the
headquarter of the Japanese military force stationed in Korea, there were 241 top
rebel leaders and 31,245 anti-Japanese “rioters” in 1908 alone, and the Japanese
military killed at least 17,779 of them from 1906 to 1911. Chōsen heigōshi also records
that there were 50,000-70,000 rioters. Cited in Kŭm, 1999 (v. 2), 9.
22
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threatened by a few rebels to cooperate in their violent acts. He
believed that the best way to deal with such rioters was conciliation
and appeasement to convert them back into “good Koreans” (良
民；ryōmin), that is, loyal subjects for the sake of Japanese empire.23
Others argued that the rioters emerged due to the social problems of
Korea rather than their will to go against their colonial masters.24 Yet
another Japanese journalist argued that Japan needed to take a harder
line and crack them down.25 In any case, in order for Japan to fight
against such spirited armed resistance to Japan’s colonial rule in
Korea and to protect the Japanese colonial authorities as well as
civilians, close political surveillance of all Korean visitors and
migrants to Japan proper became all the more important.
Those who appeared to be against the Japanese authorities
were considered dangerous (kiken), subversive (fuon), and antiJapanese ( 排 日 , hainichi) enemies. Consequently, such control of
colonized Koreans became one of the most important duties for the
Japanese Special Higher Police. These subversive Koreans were also
called blacklist Koreans (yōshisatsu senjin), anti-Japanese Koreans (hainichi
senjin), or simply “rioters” (bōto). As the threat of such “dangerous”
thoughts of “violent mobs” of Koreans intensified against the order
of the empire, those Koreans who might belong to one of those
malcontent rebel groups against Japan (futei no yakara) needed to be
kept under meticulous state surveillance.
23

“Bōto chin'atsusaku,” Chōsen 1:2, April 1, 1908, 18-19.

24

“Bōto shiron,” Chōsen 29, July 14, 1910, 20.

A number of articles appeared on this controversy concerning how to deal with
these Korean “rioters” in the newspapers and magazines in the first two decades of
the twentieth century. For example, see “Bōto oyobi sono chin'atsu,” Chōsen 1:2,
April 1, 1908: 1-7; “Kankoku bōto no tōbatsu,” Tōkyō keizai zasshi 1445 (June 27,
1908), 7-8.
25
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While Japanese intelligence often failed to differentiate
empirically between “good Koreans” from “bad Koreans,” as well as
Japanese, the political icons of ryŏmin (literally “good people” or
“noble savage,” that is to say, the innocent, pure, primitive, yet
malleable) and futei no yakara (“malcontent mob,” i.e. the rebellious,
ungrateful, violent, and dangerous) were invented and spread among
the colonial bureaucrats and ordinary Japanese alike through the
means of official announcements, mass media, and word of mouth.
The effects of such binarized representations of colonized Koreans
manifested in a dramatic and violent manner, especially when facing
moments of crisis during the first two decades of Japan’s colonial
rule over Korea.
The internal ordinance (naikun) of 1911 is a document that
illustrates the manners in which Koreans were documented and
watched over by the police force in the metropole, illustrating the
development of specific surveillance mechanisms to control the
physical movement of Koreans in the metropole:
Upon the arrival of Korean migrants and temporary visitors
to Japan (naichi), the appropriate district police must closely
watch them according to the following instructions:
1. Register them under the district police station using the No.
1 Special Form and deliver a copy of the document promptly
to the superior police office.
2. Keep watching all of their words and actions, especially to
determine whether they exhibit any anti-Japanese thought
(hainichi shisō).
3. Promptly report any important matters as you observe
them.
4. Immediately report if they move their residence to another
location along with their new address and anything that might
require special attention.
5. Make a periodic report on their whereabouts at the end of
each month, and submit it by the 5th day of the following
131
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month using the No. 2 Special Form.26
Later, the police responsibility to follow Koreans’ movements in the
metropole would also be imposed on the Japanese employers of
Korean laborers following the First World War.
In addition to the close surveillance network of the
metropolitan police, by 1913, the government published a
confidential document of official guidance to aid the police force in
their efforts to distinguish Koreans from Japanese. For example, the
Ministry of Home Affairs compiled The Source Material to Distinguish
Koreans (Chōsenjin shikibetsu shiryō) and distributed it among the top
officials in each of the major government offices and in local
prefectures. The document explains its purpose as follows:
There are an increasing number of Koreans who have
short hair and wear western clothing these days. For
this reason, they look much like the Japanese of the metropole
(naichijin). Consequently, it is getting more and more
difficult to distinguish them from the Japanese.
Therefore, at this time, a source material is provided
from above so that you can make use of it in
distinguishing Koreans from Japanese.27
Until the 1910s, it was relatively easy to distinguish Koreans
from Japanese in the metropole due to differences in their external
appearance. For example, although there were a few mistakes, such as
in a case in 1908 where a Japanese was killed in the midst of a
Japanese military campaign against Korean “rioters” due to his long
hair, which made him look more like one of the “rioters,” the
“Chōsenjin meibo chōsei no ken.” Jūhachi chiji naikun No. 71. Reprinted in Pak
Kyŏngshik, ed. Zainichi Chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei v. 1 (Tokyo, 1975), 27. Hereafter,
all translation of the Japanese language documents and emphases are mine unless
otherwise specified.
27 Keihokyoku, Ministry of Home Affairs, Chōsenjin shikibetsu shiryō ni kansuru ken
(Naimushō hi No. 1-542), October 28, 1913. Reprinted in Pak, 28.
26
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hairstyles and clothing helped distinguish Korean “rebels” from
Japanese.28 However, the detailed information contained in The Source
Material of 1913 reveals the difficulties that the new modern lifestyle
of Koreans created, which blurred the visible differences between the
people of the metropole and the colony; and therefore, further
meticulous attention to Korean facial and bodily features, language,
rituals, customs, and culture was necessary in order to make proper
distinction between Koreans and Japanese. For example,
phrenological and other physical features of Koreans were described
as following:
<Korean Physique (kokkaku) and Facial Shape>
a. The height of Koreans is not much different from
Japanese, but their posture is straighter. Fewer people in
Korea have their backs bent or stoop-shouldered than
Japanese.
b. The shape of their face is also not much different from
Japanese, but they tend to have fewer and smoother hairs.
Also, their hair tends to grow straight down. Koreans tend to
have less facial hair than Japanese. In general, Koreans tend
to have flatter faces (nopperi gao), and their beard, mustache,
and whisker tend to be thinner.
c. As for the shape of their heads, due to their custom of
putting their hair together using a head scarf (when they are
young they pull their hairs together tightly from the top of
their foreheads toward the back of the heads so the hair will
not fall over the face), some of them have their head shape
changed in the shape of that hairstyle. Also, children before
marriage put their hair together in the back and have it
straight down. So, to do this type of hair, the front and top
portion of their hair is parted in the middle of their heads to
28

The case is reported in Chōsen, 2:4 (December, 1908), 31-32.
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the left and to the right. If you look at their heads closely, you
will see many of them have the trace of this parting in their
heads. The back side of their heads tends to be flatter than
Japanese due to their use of wooden pillows.29
According to the metropolitan government’s observation of the
bodies of Koreans, there were many similarities that prevented
Japanese police from differentiating the potential “criminals” from
Japanese. Nevertheless, differences could be found upon close
observation—however generalized and exaggerated those
characteristic features may be. Overall, what was highlighted in this
guidance material was that Koreans have less hair both in their heads
and faces, and that the back of their heads were flatter than those of
Japanese. Knowing that this information was circulated primarily for
the use of the authorities, it is difficult to know how widely such
“knowledge” about the colonized bodies was spread among ordinary
Japanese in the metropole prior to the rise of any triggering event
that necessitated the use of such pseudo “knowledge” to distinguish
Koreans among themselves in reality.
Koreans in the Japanese Metropole
As an empire in Asia, Japan had the advantage of physical proximity
to its colonies, which allowed for easier access to their lands and
people. Such a convenient geographical location allowed frequent
physical exchange between the metropole and colonies. According to
the Home Ministry’s record, as of 1916, approximately 4,000
Koreans were living in Japan, mostly laborers and some students.
However, by 1920, the number increased to 32,274 including over
800 students, and, by 1923, close to 80,000 including over 1,000
students. The Korean population in Japan reached 1.5 million by the
early 1940s.30
Chōsenjin shikibetsu shiryō ni kansuru ken.
Ministry of Home Affairs, Chōsenjin gaikyō (1916 and 1920). Reprinted in Pak, 4749 and 81-83. The statistics are also found in Tamura Hiroyuki, “Shokuminchi ki
29
30
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The kinds of jobs and the lifestyle that Korean migrants had
in Japan indicate that since the late Meiji era, they had been meeting
their material and human needs for a rapidly industrializing and
increasingly militarizing Japan. The majority of Koreans living in the
Japanese metropole during the 1910s and the 1920s were manual
laborers who had come to fill the demand of labor while suppressing
the wage level in Japan.31 Many of these Korean laborers moved to
Japan toward the end of World War I when the government eased
travel regulations between the colony and the metropole due to a
labor shortage during the wartime economic boom in Japan as
Europe was preoccupied with WWI.32 This meant that, although the
Korean population increased, they had little opportunity of social
mobility in the metropole due to their little resources, education, and
short residence in Japan. Therefore, they occupied the lowest rung of
the socio-economic strata, and the situation did not change much
until the end of the colonial period. 33 Furthermore, they had little

‘naichi’ zaijū Chōsenjin jinkō” in Tokyo toritsu daigaku keizai gakubu keizai gakkai 52
(1983), 31-36; Kim Indŏk, Shikminji shidae chaeil Chosŏnin undong yŏngu (Seoul, 1996),
31 and 50; Tonomura Masaru, Zainichi Chōsenjin shakai no rekishigakuteki kenkyū
(Tokyo, 2004), 83.
For example, in the year of 1920 close to 90 percent of the Korean population in
Japan was working in the fields of mining, manufacturing, construction, and other
physical labor. And, although the Korean population in Japan increased
significantly during the next two decades, the percentage of manual laborers among
Koreans mostly did not change. Kim, 39 (chart 3) and Tonomura, 83.
31

For further information on Korean laborers during this time, see Ken
Kawashima, The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2009).
32

Many farmers in Korea had extreme financial difficulty following the land reform
and economic policy changes brought by the colonial government after the
annexation of Korea in 1910. For further information on the place of origin and
33

135

Series IV, Volume 3, No. 1, March 2013

means to communicate with Japanese in the language of the
metropole, nor much chance to intermingle with the Japanese, for
many of those Korean laborers lived in segregated ghetto areas in
industrial cities or near mines.
Koreans in Japan in the early twentieth century also included
students who had little chance to get higher education in the colony
since it was only in the 1920s that the colonial government allowed
for Korea to have a public university. 34 What is interesting about
Korean students in the Japanese cities was that, while they came from
either the privileged elite class or were sponsored by the government
until the early 1910s, those who came to Japan during the late 1910s
and 1920s were largely self-supported. Many of the blacklist Koreans
during the 1920s were in fact those student-workers who often
delivered newspapers, drove rickshaws, and worked as menial
laborers during the course of their study, thus dragging on the period
of their stay in Japan before graduation. During these years, many of
them became interested and more keenly aware of various social
problems while engaging more actively with the laborers in their daily
lives in such areas as Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto. For example, many
of these self-supported students not only devoted themselves to their
study in school but also organized themselves to protest and raise
consciousness among themselves facing ethnic, class, and colonial
discrimination in the metropole.35 These students often wore Western
class composition of Koreans in Japan in the early twentieth century, see
Tonomura, 2004.
The Government General’s Office of Korea prohibited not only the
establishment of private colleges and universities but also public universities. It was
not until 1924 that it finally found Kyŏngsŏng cheguk taehakkyo (Keijō Imperial
University), the first and only university in Korea.
34

Kim, 50 (chart 5) and 51. For example, many of these self-supported students
were active members of the student organizations such as Haguhoe or Tokyo
Korean YMCA.
35
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clothes and hairstyles as well as spoke the language of the metropole,
which made themselves more and more invisible to the eyes of
surveillance, as it intensified the colonial anxiety of the authorities.
The biases and double standards against Koreans living in
Japan had already developed as Japan sought to maximize its political,
economic, and cultural control over Korea and its people. Now, such
prejudices toward Koreans grew and spread as the Japanese observed
the increasingly critical attitude that the progressive students, labor
leaders, and independence movement activists took toward Japan’s
harsh military over the colonized. Furthermore, following the end of
World War I, the Japanese economy began to slow down as the
wartime economic boom came to an end, and the employers began
to look for cheaper Korean laborers to replace Japanese laborers.
Therefore, the animosity between Korean and Japanese laborers
resurged in a competitive mode in the realm of the metropolitan
economy, even as they were fed government propaganda for the
mission of assimilating Koreans based on the geographical, historical,
and cultural affinities between the two people.
The futei senjin discourse emerged in such a political, economic,
and cultural context, and turned the colonized population into
“invisible enemies” within the metropole. This process reveals not
only the arbitrary nature of constructing “Koreanness” as Japan’s
ethnic and political Other but also the anxiety that Japanese had
about Koreans, whether they agree or disagree to “assimilate” to their
colonial master. However, the critical occasions where Japanese in
the metropole exhibit a sense of urgency to distinguish the Korean
population from Japanese the most did not come until moments of
collective violence against the colonized: the March First Movement
in 1919 and the Kantō Massacre in 1923.
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Good Koreans and Bad Koreans: Cracking Down on the
Enemy Within
It was in the midst of the 1919 March First Independence Movement
in Korea 36 that the label of futei senjin appeared frequently as the
dominant phrase to refer to Koreans throughout official documents,
newspapers, and magazines in the metropole. This politically charged
term began to appear in newspaper reports concerning the March
First protest and the subsequent governmental security ordinances to
suppress it. In particular, when the contemporary Japanese Prime
Minister Hara Takashi (1856-1921) decided to subdue the originally
non-violent demonstration with military forces, he evoked the image
of violent Koreans (bōto) and utilized such terms as futei as the reason
why authorities adopted the policy of military suppression against the
peaceful protesters. 37 Upon hearing of the eruption of the public
protest in the colony, Hara in Tokyo sent the following message to
the Governor-General of Korea:

The March First Movement in Korea was sparked by the Korean students’
declaration of independence of Korea in Tokyo earlier that year, and began as a
peaceful declaration of independence in colonial Korea. The violent military
suppression of the protest resulted in the deaths of six to seven thousand Koreans
in the colony, approximately the same number of victims as the massacre that took
place in the Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area in about three years.
36

For examples of such media reports on the March First Movement, see Asano
Kenichi, “Futei no bōto to kimetsuketa nittei media: Kankoku San Ichi undō ha
dou bōdō saretaka.” Hyōron shakai kagaku 58 (Kyoto, 1998): 121- 134.
37
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Domestically and internationally, we must make
this incident appear as a minor problem. However,
as to the practical measure to respond to the
incident, we must deal with it thoroughly and
seriously so that such a thing will never happen
again.38
Consequently, Hara sought a means to justify the use of increased
Japanese military force to suppress the wide-spread protest against
Japanese rule in the colony while avoiding embarrassment of the
empire domestically and internationally. Hara recorded in his diary
that he presented the following announcement as the reason why it
was necessary to send additional troops to Korea:
We would be in trouble if such use of military
force is understood simply as a punitive
subjugation force. Therefore, we will announce
that we do so in order to protect good people
(ryōmin) from the violent behaviors of a small
number of the malcontent (ichibu futei no yakara) in
Korea.39
Hara announced that although most Koreans do not oppose Japan’s
colonial rule, there are a few “malcontent” Koreans who are leading
anti-Japanese riots; therefore it is indispensable to increase Japan’s
military force in the colony.
Since Hara’s announcement, most of the subsequent Japanese
newspaper articles that were published across Japan from March
1919 to August 1923 concerning the March First Movement and
Koreans in general contained futei senjin in their headlines, and
appeared
under
the
section
categories
of
“national
Hara Takashi Nikki, v. 8 (Tokyo, 1998). Cited in Kŭm Pyŏngdong, Nihonjin no
Chōsenkan: so no hikari to kage (Tokyo, 2006), 209.
38

39

Ibid.
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movements”(minzoku undō), “national security” (keibi), and “labor
movements” (rōdō sōgi) with headlines related to conspiracy, threat,
robbery, anti-Japanese thought, secret meetings, secret codes, radicals,
traitors, or bombs. While the root cause and the reality of Japan’s
brutal military rule in Korea behind the outbreak of the March First
Movement rarely mentioned, most of these articles highlighted
“ungrateful” Koreans’ “crimes” in creating the threat to the peace
and order of the empire. There were at least several hundreds of such
newspaper headlines even within the following three year-period
alone. Interestingly, however, many of those articles reported alleged
crimes by those futei senjin rather than the actual.40
The criteria for judging futei senjin, that is “wrong, malcontent,
and rebellious Koreans,” were rooted in Korean efforts to restore
national sovereignty at home.41 Thus, the frequent use of the term
futei senjin reflected the increasing level of fear of widely organized
independence movements that Koreans might be carrying out from
within and without. Furthermore, such a possibility was manifested in
the establishment of the Interim Government of Korea in exile in
Shanghai immediately following the large-scale mass protest against
Japan in 1919, which further signaled the potential for stronger
For example, see the headlines such as “futei senjin entered with bombs, Tokyo
threatened”(June 9, 1920), “Korean conspiracy revealed, many futei senjin secretly
entered the capital city” (Kōbe shinbun, April 17, 1920), “Attempted bombing of futei
senjin”(Yorozu chōhō, June 18, 1920), “Futei senjin conspiracy for independence
movement” (Yorozu chōhō, August 24, 1920), “Organized futei senjin’s new plan
revealed” (Moji shinbun, September 3, 1920), “Futei senjin’s telegram with secret
codes…” (Osaka asahi shinbun, December 17, 1920) and numerous other similar
headlines following the year of the March First Movement.
40

Likewise, An Chung-gŭn, the assassin of Itō Hirobumi, Resident-General of
Korea prior to Japan’s annexation of the country, questioned the meaning of
“wrong and violent” when those who tried to protect their country and the
independence of the nation were labeled as “rioters” in the late 1900s colonial
Korea. Cited in Kŭm (1999), 21-22.
41
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resistance of Koreans against its colonial master. Assassination
attempts targeting key colonial authorities and armed struggles
against the Japanese military and police arose in the border areas of
Korea, such as Manchuria, where Koreans had less strict surveillance
of Japan. Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, and especially
after the March First movement, many Koreans migrated to the
northeastern borderland of Korea, China, and Russia, and this border
region became one of the centers for increased military conflict
between the colonizers and the colonized. These movements were
powerful enough to impress not only the colonial authorities 42 but
also the people in the metropole, as they learned about the news of
Koreans’ protest and armed struggle, which influenced the ways in
which Koreans and “Koreanness” were associated with violence and
danger in the minds of the metropolitans.
Japan’s efforts to block Korean independence movements
from being connected to Japanese radical revolutionary forces
pushed the colonial force to establish punitive as well as preemptive
expeditions against anti-Japanese, rebellious Koreans in Manchuria in
1920.43 After 1920, the government also made concentrated efforts to
crack down on both the blacklisted Koreans (now in the name of futei
senjin)44 and the “radicals” in the metropole. Thus, those who were
For examples of the colonial authorities’ prevalent use of the term futei senjin
since March 1919, see v. 27 of Kantōchō keimukyoku shiryō (1919-1934; 80 vols),
especially the section on “futei senjin dantai oyobi seiryoku chō”; Also see Chōsen
Sōtokufu (GGK), Taigai kyokuhi zaigai futei senjin no kinjō, 1921-1925 and the
collection of the Government-General of Korea documents concerning the futei
senjin crack-down plans in Kim Chŏngju, Chōsen tōchi shiryō series v. 8, Futei senjin,
(Tokyo, 1971).
42

For example, see the example of an armed challenge to the Japanese office in the
Hunchun area in Imai Seiichi, “Futei senjin to Hunchun jiken,” in Fujiwara Akira et
al., Nihon kindai shi no kyozō to jitszō (Tokyo, 1990).
43

44

Home Ministry, Chōsenjin gaikyō, 1920, 83.
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labeled as “malcontent radical” Koreans, that is the “Senjin Reds”
(sekka Chōsenjin), were the prime targets of the intelligence police.
Both the radical Japanese elites and Koreans were challenging the
authorities. If the Japanese and Korean radicals were to form a united
front against the government, the matters would become more
serious.
In this context, by 1921, the alleged futei senjin’s photos and
handwritings were collected throughout the empire to crack them
down preemptively, using the police network and Korean language
speaking spies. The Government General of Korea also researched
the hometown of each of the identified futei senjin leaders, including
those who continued their armed struggle against Japan. GGK drew
a map of these locations and established the crack-down strategies. It
also declared futei students dangerous objects that required stricter
state surveillance.45 It was for the authorities to prevent any potential
cooperation between futei senjin and Japanese radicals, and such
efforts to search for them went as far as Russian territories, Shanghai,
the U.S., not to mention in their home front.46 Soon, the term futei
senjin became one of the most frequently appearing idioms in the
newspaper and government reports representing Koreans, invoking
the images of violent, radical, and fearsome Koreans who were
threatening the Japanese authorities and its people.
Interestingly, as the images of futei senjin appeared frequently
in official propaganda and newspapers in the metropole immediately
following March 1919, some Koreans and those who were
empathetic to the cause of Korean independence used the term in a
subversive manner in their publications and activism. However, such
Chōsen Sōtokufu (GGK), Imbodan kenkyo ichirannzu, Futei senjin shurei shuryō
shusshinchi bunpozu, Bakudan tōteki hatsugen ichirannzu, GGK documents, 1921. Also,
see “Pullyŏng haksaeng p’anjŏng,” Maeil shinbo, May 16, 1919.
45

46

“Introduction,” Kim, 1971.
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efforts to reveal the contradictory nature of Japan’s colonial policies
toward Korea were put under harsh surveillance and could not
continue, as in the case of the short-lived anarchist group Futeisha and
its magazine Futei Senjin.47 To them, futeisha meant those who resisted
against the authorities, and they used it for their journal title rather
sarcastically. At the same time, as the colonial government’s
crackdown of futei senjin continued, the term gained popular
perception in the colony as people associated it with the patriotic and
heroic cause of the liberation of Korea from Japan’s brutal colonial
rule. However, the cost was great, the massacre of the so-called futei
senjin immediately following the earthquake in the metropole in 1923.

Futei Senjin amidst the Earthquake, Rumor, and the Massacre

As the fearsome images of Koreans spread, it took only a trigger for
ordinary Japanese to act in response. On September 1st, 1923, the
Great Kantō Earthquake brought over 100,000 deaths and the
missing, marking a moment of unprecedented material and human
destruction.48 This biggest earthquake of twentieth-century Japan was
Quite comically, as a means to avoid the publication censorship, Futeisha used
“Futoi” instead of “Futei” in the magazine title, thus meaning “fat” Koreans
instead of “rebellious” Koreans.
47

For further information on the scope of the material damage and the death toll
caused by the earthquake, see Kaizōsha, ed., Taishō daishinkasairoku (Tokyo, 1924);
Keishichō, Taishō daishinkasaishi (Tokyo, 1925); Ministry of Home Affairs, The Great
Earthquake of 1923 in Japan, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1926); Naimushō shakaikyoku, Taishō
shinsaishi. 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1926); Nihon sekijūjisha, ed., Taishō jūni nen Kantō daishinsai
nihon sekijūjisha kyūgoshi (Tokyo, 1925); Tōkyōfu, Tōkyōfu Taishō shinsai shi (Tokyo,
1925); Tōkyōshi, Tōkyō shinsai roku (Tokyo, 1926-1927). Note that the recent
scholarship tends to agree that the number of victims that appear in these original
contemporary documents included double counting of some victims, thus reducing
the figure from 140,000 to 100,000. See ch. 2 in Kitahara Itoko, Kantō daishinsai no
shakaigaku (Tokyo, 2011).
48
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soon followed by various rumors, including the impending arson,
rape, and rebellious riots by malcontent Koreans. Such rumors
created an urgent security threat, and to the government leaders with
the shock of the 1917 Russian Revolution, the 1918 Rice Riots, and
the 1919 mass protest of the colonized still haunting their minds, it
was a time that required vigorous social control and maintenance of
order. Accordingly, as early as the day following the earthquake the
government imposed martial law. To the military leaders, it was an
opportunity to strengthen their status and authority in their struggle
with the decreasing popularity of the military following the retreat
from Siberia and the naval force reduction agreement with other
world powers in 1922. 49 The rumors also evoked immediate
“defense” against Koreans among ordinary Japanese in and beyond
the disaster area. The result was the massacre of over six thousand
Koreans in the Tokyo-Yokohama area perpetrated by Japanese
soldiers, police, and vigilantes, mostly during the first week following
the outbreak of the earthquake and the rumors.50
For further discussion on the rumors following the 1923 earthquake and the
significance of analyzing rumors as a window to the contemporary Japanese society,
see ch. 2 in Jinhee Lee, “Instability of Empire: Earthquake, Rumor, and the
Massacare of Koreans in the Japanese Empire.” PhD dissertation (Urbana, 2004).
49

Newspaper reports often indicated that the names and identities of the
massacred Koreans were not known, as in the special edition of Ōsaka mainichi
October 20 and 21, 1923. There is a wide range of discrepancy among the results of
the “investigation” concerning the number of the massacre victims as in the case
of: the Ministry of Justice (275), the newsletter of the Interim Government of
Korea Independence (6,661), Tokyo Imperial University professor Yoshino Sakuzō
(2,613), Kokuryūkai (722: Tokyo only), and the combination of the numbers that
were published in the contemporary newspaper reports (1,464). Although it is
extremely difficult to track down the exact Korean population in the Kantō area at
the time of the disaster, most informed and widely accepted speculation among
historians indicates approximately 20,000 Koreans living in the area as of the time
of the earthquake in 1923 out of 60,000 in total across Japan. Among them the
number of the massacre victims is known to be close to six thousand considering
50

144

Studies on Asia

Despite the absence of the usual means of communication in
the midst of disaster, the rumors against futei senjin spread throughout
Eastern Japan with surprising rapidity. The violent earth tremors
stopped and the great winds and firestorms began to die down, but
people were terrified, not by the natural disaster but by the imagined
impending attacks of arson, rape, poisoning, and organized riots by
the subjugated in the center of the empire. Various records, including
government documents, police officers’ reports in different locations,
and individual testimonies and memoirs indicate that the rumors
began to prevail in multiple spots in the Tokyo-Yokohama area as
early as the first night following the earthquake, and they spread to
every town in the region after the second day of the disaster.51
The records of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department
show how widespread such rumors were during the first few days
following the earthquake. Eighty percent of Tokyo police precincts
reported similar rumors, and the anxiety upon hearing such rumors
compelled many Japanese citizens to search for futei senjin in their
own towns and villages. For example, the Sugamo Precinct reported
as early as the first day of the earthquake:

the estimated total population of Koreans in the area, the number who was
interned by the authorities as well as returnees to Korea. For further discussion on
the subject, see Kang Tŏk-sang, Kantōdaishinsai gyakusatsu no kioku (Tokyo, 2003),
288-293.
51

For example, see Keishichō, Taishō daishinkasaishi.
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There was a rumor that said, “Koreans are trying
to overthrow Tokyo as a whole, bombing, and
murdering people with poison.” People heard
and believed it, so they organized the vigilantes
and started persecuting Koreans.52
On the second day of the earthquake, the Tomizaka Police Office
reported:
Warning: Because futei senjin and others are
poisoning the water source, it has become
necessary to cut the water supply. They are
poisoning the wells and food as well.53
As many survivors testified, there was a cry in the streets by
government authorities and ordinary citizens alike warning against
Koreans.54 As waves of disaster refugees escaped to the outskirts of
the metropolis along the major roads, the rumors and the subsequent
reaction in the form of massacring Koreans spread quickly
throughout the Kantō area. Until then, the alarm among the disaster
survivors had been chiefly about surviving the quake and escaping
from the fire. But when the rumors reached them, they were even
more frightened than they had been by the earthquake they had just
survived.
Jikeidan, or self-defense group, refers to the local security
maintenance force that grew rapidly during the late 1910s and the
early 1920s. The 1923 earthquake provided a watershed moment for
such civilian organizations to exercise authority for the sake of
“public security” facing the shortage of official police. One of the
52

Keishichō, 1292.

53

Keishichō, 1079-80.

Ch’ae, P’ilgŭn. “Kwandong taejinjae tangshi rŭl chŭnggŏham.” Sasanggye (May
1964): 163.
54
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main purposes of these post-earthquake vigilantes was to patrol their
hometown and take “appropriate” measures to preempt potential
violence allegedly threatened by the “rebellious Koreans.” Numerous
testimonies and official as well as individual records by the disaster
survivors suggest that such “self-defense” vigilantism was widely
practiced during the time of physical and social chaos. However, the
total number of vigilante groups at the time of the earthquake is not
clearly known, especially considering the arbitrary ways in which the
criteria were established to label a defense group a systematic
“organization.” There were vigilantes attacking Koreans following
the spread of the rumors not only in the disaster-stricken area but
across the nation. 55 As of mid-September, there were at least 1,145
vigilante groups within the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture alone,
which increased to 1,593 by the end of October. The total number of
vigilante organizations throughout the Kantō area reached 3,689,
close to half of which existed in the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture. 56
The activities by the vigilantes, often illegally armed with guns
and Japanese swords or skewers, included setting up checkpoints to
single out Koreans among the passers-by, either by asking for
Japanese pronunciations which were difficult for Korean speakers,
the lyrics of Kimigayo (the national anthem that praises the emperor),
or observing their physical features such as the shape of the back of
the head or the cheekbones, hair, and relatively tall height. Then, the
vigilante groups either brought the Koreans to the police, military, or
According to Yamada’s study of various contemporary newspapers across Japan,
the existence of such anti-Korean vigilante organizations can be found well beyond
the Kantō area ranging from Tōhoku (the Northeastern region) to Kansai (the
Southwestern region). See Yamada, 114-6. Also see his five volumes collection of
the Japanese language local papers around the 1923 earthquake, Yamada ed.,
Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren shinbun hōdō shiryō. 5 vols (Tokyo, 2004).
56 Yoshikawa Mitsusada. Kantōdaishinsai no chian kaiko (Tokyo, 1949), 43; Gendaishi
no kai, ed. Kikan gendaishi 9. Nihon gunkokushugi no soshiki teki kiban: zaigō gunjinkai to
seinendan (Tokyo, 1978), 274.
55
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intern camps,57 or killed them on the spot, thus making the vigilante
activities not “defense” for themselves but an offense against the
imagined enemy within.58
To many children, the rumors and the following mayhem
against Koreans were so traumatic that they, in response to
schoolteachers’ surveys, listed futei senjin and the violent persecution
of the Koreans among the top things that scared them most. 59
Remembering the first few nights she spent outdoors with her
parents following the disaster, an elementary school girl saw the
adults of the town getting nervous and excited. The “self-defense”
vigilantes were spreading the rumors against futei senjin, which made
her feel all the more terrified and helpless in her fear of attack by the
savagery “enemies.” On the night she and her family were staying in
the bamboo grove, she thought she “would die rather than endure
the fear of attack by Koreans.” 60 Children’s fear of the imagined
violence by futei senjin and the shock of observing such mass violence

Yoshikawa records 3,412 for the number of Koreans whom the vigilantes
handed over to the military or the police. See Yoshikawa, 52.
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The accounts of vigilante activities are included in various earthquake reports
published by different organizations as well as newspaper reports during the first
several months after the disaster, especially during the months of October and
November when the official publication censorship was lifted following the
Japanese government’s public announcement while the trials were going on
concerning the vigilante violence related to Koreans.
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Tokyo shiyakusho and Yorozu chōhōsha eds., Shinsai kinen jūichi ji gojū hachi fun
(Tokyo, 1924).
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Quoted from a student writing in Kyōbashi Higher Elementary School in Tokyo,
reprinted in Kŭm Pyŏng-dong, ed., Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren jidō shōgen shiryō vol.1
(Tokyo, 1989), 393.
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was one of the themes that frequently appeared in their writings and
paintings when the schools reopened later that fall.61
Various theories have been developed concerning the origin
of the rumors. It ranged from the political leaders, military, police,
liberated prisoners, socialists, anarchists, and right-wing fanatics, to
the witnesses of some random violence such as an accident caused by
panicked horses in the streets in various parts of the earthquakestricken area. 62 Overall, the preserved documents suggest that the
rumors began among the earthquake survivors and generally spread
from Yokohama to Tokyo along the major routes taken by many of
the disaster refugees. These highlight one of the key elements in the
widely accepted rumors, revealing what was fearsome in the
metropole: the pre-conceived images of Koreans as “malcontent” or
“rebellious.” This representation of Japan’s Korean others in the
metropole under the rubric of futei senjin revealed the dilemma of the
contradictory simultaneous projects of Japan between differentiation
and assimilation of the colonized: the very rationale behind the
colonization of Korea based on the similarities between Japan and
Korea versus ethnic hierarchy, with Japan on top of Korea based on
their inherent differences.
The Phantom of Futei Senjin: The Imagined Inversion of
Colonial Violence
A contemporary writer, Nakanishi Inosuke (1890-1958), aptly
pointed out the ubiquitous negative images of Koreans as dangerous
For the analysis of one of the children’s drawings concerning their experiences of
the earthquake and its aftermath, see Arai Katsuhiro, “Shōnen ga mita Chōsenjin
gyakusatsu.” Rekishi kagaku to kyōiku (1997). For children’s writings, see Tokyo
shiyakusho [Tokyo Municipal Office] and Yorozu chōhōsha, eds., Shinsai kinen jūichi
ji gojū hachi fun (Tokyo, 1924), 433-4. Also see the selected post-quake children’s
writings in Kŭm, ed., Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren jidō shōgen shiryō.
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Hayakawa Tokuji, “Tsuma mo ko mo jigyō mo ubawarete,” Ushio (October 1974).
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soon after the massacre, reflecting on the culture of the empire since
the late 1910s across the metropole and the colony:
Look at the daily newspapers in Korea and Japan.
What are they reporting concerning Koreans? I’ve
never seen any article that talks about the natural
beauty, artistic aesthetics, and grace of the people
in Korea. They are reporting rebellious activities
of so-called futei senjin, listing sensational words
like bomb, gun, raid, and killing—and some
papers even changed from futei to fuhei senjin
(“complaining Koreans”) lately . . . . I think that
anyone with no previous knowledge of Korea and
Koreans… who sees these papers will think that
Korea is a country of bandits, and Koreans are as
violent as wild animals . . . . Weren’t the rumors
against Koreans at this time a natural explosion of
such a Japanese subconscious? Wasn’t it
unreasonable fear of some sort of dark
phantom?63
Indeed, the fear of violent attempts by Koreans captured the minds
of many in the metropole immediately. The impact of such a colonial
regime of representation was influential in creating the “phantom”
images of Korean rebels in the midst of the disaster under the
influence of imperialism. The fear and the effect of colonial
representation of Koreans as violent were no longer limited to the
ruling authority or a few imperial expansionists in Tokyo. These
characterizations captured the minds of children and adults, men and
women, and the entire political spectrum from left to right in the
metropole. Such a colonial representation created and perpetuated
Nakanishi Inosuke, “Chōsenjin no tameni benzu,” Fujin kōron (November and
December 1923). Reprinted in Kŭm Pyŏng-dong, ed. Kantō daishinsai chōsenjin
gyakusatsu mondai kankei shiryō vol. 3, Chishikijin no hannō. 2 volumes (Tokyo, 1996),
267.
63
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the images of the subjugated people as “dangerous,” even to the
degree that Japanese children would stop crying when their parents
urged them to do so by telling them the “Koreans were coming.” 64
The images were also confirmed as they observed the public
endorsement of the rumors and subsequent execution of the alleged
futei senjin by the government as well as local leaders and vigilantes
across the spectrum of their political or class disposition.
At the time of facing such a threat of impending attack,
Japanese people practiced social inscription of their preconceived
images of the Others on to the body of the persecuted for the
purpose of distinguishing them from the community that needs to be
protected. How people are perceived controls how they are treated,
and the physical differences between Koreans and Japanese became
crucial in such a moment of identifying the enemies within. The
visible social markers were sought and found in Korean hair styles,
facial features, and head shapes that had been observed and
documented by the authorities earlier. Although they did not
constitute any decisive genetic dissimilarity, nor the behavioral
tendency toward violence in their character, these differences
nevertheless constituted some of the prime means of developing and
reinforcing the signs of difference. Such representation confirmed the
colonial relations between Korea and Japan by publicly
acknowledging and reproducing peculiar images of the colonized in
the metropole.
Since by nature of rumors are collective, the imagination of
the enemy within “us” required the rigorous task of differentiating
those to be protected from those to be punished. To those who did
not believe the rumors initially, the expected disciplinary responses to
the rumors against imagined enemies posed the fear of the crowd. In
the process of spreading the rumors and observing the post-quake
turmoil, many of those who doubted the rumors initially appeared to
64

Cited in Ch’ae, 163.
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have been either persuaded or compelled by the content of the
rumors to embrace the shared concerns for “us.” Somekawa Ransen,
a banker in Tokyo, laughed at the rumors on the second day after the
quake, but soon realized that by the third day he, like his neighbors,
had become increasingly thrilled at the vigilantes’ punishment of the
alleged “enemies.” 65 Whether his reaction was a reflection of his
newly found belief in the rumors against futei senjin or a disciplinary
effect of the rhetoric of “us” and “them,” his changing responses led
him to react differently as he faced the moment of practicing violence
in the midst of the crowd.
An elementary school child wrote that he felt good and
gained courage as he saw the vigilantes beating Koreans in his
neighborhood. Other children expressed feelings of satisfaction and
amusement when they observed the vigilante violence.
Simultaneously, they showed sympathy toward the Korean victims of
the brutal violence as well. Nevertheless, after the experiences of
such prolonged fear of the imagined enemies by hearing the rumors
for many days in the midst of the turmoil, the children showed great
relief in observing Koreans getting “arrested” before their eyes. It is
not surprising, then, to see these ambivalent feelings of fear, anger,
and sympathy toward Koreans in the eyes of children and many
adults who were disciplined in their colonial views while responding
to the rumors they had heard and the fictional “revenge” they saw in
the murder of the subjugated people in their towns.
While some refused to be part of the collective violence,
others were afraid to be excluded from the community, and thus
from being “protected” from the imagined enemies. There was a
sense of duty or requirement to perform as one of “us” in the
vigilante activities. Also present was the threat that people felt
signaling the violence that might be projected onto themselves by the
collective body if they did not conform to the idea of persecuting futei
65

Somekawa Ransen, Shinsai nisshi (1923; repr., Tokyo, 1981).
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senjin. Once they participated in the vigilante violence, some felt
disillusionment at the violence itself while others were disciplined to
commit themselves to mass murder by quickly learning to believe the
rumors as truth in their collective “defense” against Koreans.
The mob psychology and peer pressure were so great that
when police officers denied the Koreans’ impending attacks as
unconfirmed, the vigilantes believed they could not trust the police to
control the Koreans and refused to believe the innocence of the
Koreans. The transcripts of the Fujioka vigilante trial recorded:
When the sheriff from the Prefecture Office had
explained to the crowd that the Korean who was
arrested was not a rebel, Kimura (the accused)
claimed that the denial of the impending attack
of Koreans in the police report was not true…
and that to kill rebellious Koreans was an
appropriate measure of self-defense that needed to be
rewarded.66
In other words, the particular collective response to the rumors in the
name of “self-defense” was powerful enough, not only to justify the
violence against the innocent but also to claim reward from the
society regardless of the reality. In this sense, not only the fear of the
colonized but also the fear of the crowd became a significant source
of sustaining and aggravating the rumors of futei senjin and the
massacre among the participants and spectators of the vigilante
violence.
Simultaneously, the public display of vigilante violence had
the effect of “verifying” the rumors as truth, for the spectators of the
vigilantes’ “defense” measures against the “captured enemies”
educated them and confirmed their beliefs about their imagined
Fujioka vigilante trial records at Maebashi District Court, November 14 1923,
2574-2575. For further discussion on the vigilante trials following the massacre, see
ch. 3 in Lee, 2004.
66
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“reality.”67 Thus, the rumors became reality in their refusal to believe
otherwise while they were sharing the cooperative practice of “selfprotection” on behalf of the Japanese “public” (kō) against the
imagined enemy within. These multilayered fears, which often
worked simultaneously in the minds of the perpetrators justifying the
collective violence, blurred the boundary between fact and fiction,
and thus, reality and rumors in the metropole, reflecting the
mechanism of cyclical violence under the influence of colonialism
back home.
Kurosawa Akira (1910-1998), who later became a world
famous filmmaker, recollected his troublesome experience in the
aftermath of the earthquake in his autobiography, describing both the
unleashed fear of the colonized and the power of the crowd as
important mechanisms in the spread of both rumors and
participation in the violence:
With my own eyes I saw a mob of adults with
contorted faces rushing like an avalanche in
confusion, yelling, “This way!” “No, that way!”
They were chasing a bearded man, thinking
someone with so much facial hair could not be
Japanese….Simply because my father had a full
beard, he was surrounded by a mob carrying clubs.
My heart pounded as I looked at my brother, who
was with him. My brother was smiling
sarcastically….68
For example, the accused vigilantes’ defense in the trial transcripts from Saitama
and Gunma prefectures indicates the gradual development of their motives in the
mayhem while participating in group action, and being co-opted in the process of
capturing and publicly “punishing” the futei senjin. For further analysis of the
vigilante trial discourse, see Lee, 2008 and ch. 3 in Lee, 2004.
68 Kurosawa Akira, Something like an Autobiography, Audie E. Bock, trans. (New York,
NY: Vintage, 1983), 51. For Japansese version, Kurosawa Akira, Gama no abura:
jiden yōna mono (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1990 and 2001).
67
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The episode illustrates the ways in which colonial representation was
imposed on the physical body of the colonized, linking the arbitrary
criterion and the imagined anti-colonial violence in an attempt to
make the invisible enemy within as visible as possible. In the town
where Kurosawa lived, as in many other communities, it was required
for one male from each household to participate in the self-defense
activities. Since his older brother and father dismissed the rumors and
refused to join the vigilantes, Kurosawa himself had to represent his
household, though he thought the reactions of the adults to the
rumors rather odd:
In our neighborhood each household had to have
one person stand guard at night. My brother,
however, thumbed his nose at the whole idea and
made no attempt to take his turn. Seeing no other
solution, I took up my wooden sword and was led
to a drainage pipe that was barely wide enough for
a cat to crawl through. They posted me here and
said, “Koreans might be able to sneak in through
here.” …. But there was an even more ridiculous
incident. They told us not to drink the water from
one of our neighborhood wells. The reason was
that the wall surrounding the well had some kind
of strange notation written on it in white chalk.
This was supposedly a Korean code indication
that the well water had been poisoned. I was
flabbergasted. The truth was that the strange
notation was a scribble I myself had written.
Seeing adults behaving like this, I couldn’t help
shaking my head and wondering what human
beings are all about.69
Kurosawa, 51-52. Also see Kurosawa’s video interview in Kurosawa: A
Documentary on the Acclaimed Director (New York, 2002).
69
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Rampant fear of the colonized disciplined the crowd to differentiate
the imagined enemy from “us,” constantly drawing a line, even by
such an arbitrary measure as a beard, turning children’s scribble and
the marks of milk or newspaper delivery schedules on houses into
fearful signs of imminent terror and conspiracy in their imagination.
The arbitrariness was recognized by some of “us” but this
recognition could not be spoken in public because “we” were
expected to conform to the violence against the differentiated
colonial Others.
Wachi Masataka was also stopped by the vigilantes as they
observed the shape of his relatively flat back head. The vigilantes
were sure that Wachi was a Korean based on his physical appearance.
To make matters worse, Wachi was in a panic and could not speak
any Japanese at their demand of pronouncing the Japanese words
that Korean speakers suppposedly find difficult to pronounce. As the
police officer came, the vigilantes asked him: “Sir, this is a futei senjin.
So, can we kill him now?” At this point, Wachi cried out that he was
Japanese and survived the crisis moment. 70 Itō Seiichi also
remembered that the vigilantes in Tokyo were looking for the signs
of physical characteristics to distinguish Koreans, saying “Koreans
have a long face” or “have few facial hairs.”71
Playwright Senda Koreya (1904-1994) also remembered the
threatening moment of the earthquake, and witnessed the
persecution of Koreans himself, surrounded by a violent crowd in
Sendagaya, Tokyo:
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Nicchō kyōkai toyoshima shibu ed., Minzoku no toge (Tokyo, 1973), 38-39.
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Nicchō kyōkai toyoshima shibu ed, 54.
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On the second night after the earthquake, there
were foolish rumors about Koreans who were
allegedly on their way to raid the town to get
revenge on the Japanese for their accumulated
anger, and that sounded real….Then the
vigilantes captured a Korean, bound him with
wire, and harassed him in street. Everybody was
shouting, “Kill! Kill!” 72
Senda’s real name was Itō Kunio, but when he was mistaken for
Korean and experienced disillusionment with the outcome of the
prevalent colonial relations between the colonizer and the imperial
subjects—thus, sharing the critical experience of Kurosawa’s father
and the famous filmmaker himself—Senda’s life was deeply affected
by this violent experience to such a degree that he gave himself a new
name:
In the midst of all that, someone suddenly hit me
from behind….It turned out that I was mistaken
for Korean, and they wouldn’t believe me even
though I denied it over and over saying, “I am
Japanese…I am a student at Waseda University,”
with my student ID at hand. They asked me to
say “a i u e o” 73 and recite the names of the
emperors in Japanese history….Fortunately,
there was a person who recognized me….
Afterward, my friends suggested that I take
“Senda Koreya” (that is, “a Korean in
Sendagaya”) as my pen name.74
Senda Koreya. Cited in Pae So, Shashin hōkoku Kantō daishinsai Chōsenjin gyakusatsu
(Tokyo, 1988), 13.
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The first line of Japanese alphabets.
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Ibid.
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It was a time when any Japanese had to be cautious not to be
mistaken for a Korean, simply to survive. Indeed, the life-threatening
experience of the power of the crowd was traumatic enough for the
writer to change his name so that he would not forget this important
moment of his life. A student from Kyūshū, Iwao Ken, had a similar
experience in Mikawajima in Tokyo: Due to his Kyūshū accent in his
language along with his student uniform, he was also mistaken for a
futei senjin student.75
Overall, the metropole in 1923 was in flux when rationality
was most helpless. The culture of terror, fear, and violence pervaded.
Torture was practiced, disseminated, and embodied through gossip
and rumor against the colonized people. The torture on the bodies of
Koreans revealed excesses that turned the projections of wildness
and savagery back from the colonized onto the torturers
themselves.76 Not surprisingly, the confusion and contradiction in the
mechanism of differentiating Koreans from Japanese caused the
massacre of not only futei senjin but also at least fifty Japanese and two
hundred Chinese who were mistaken for Koreans.77 In some cases,
the local populace attacked not only the police stations where
Koreans were either temporarily interned or had sought refuge,78 but
also some Chinese and Japanese who were mistaken for Koreans.79
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Nicchō kyōkai toyoshima shibu ed., 52.

Nicholas B. Dirks, Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, 1992), 18.
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On Chinese victims of the 1923 massacre, see Niki Fumiko, Shinsai ka no
chūgokujin daigyakusatsu (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1993) and Kantō daishinsai chūgokujin
daigyakusatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991). Also see Hiroshi Tahara. Kantōdaishinsai to ō
kiten jiken: mu hitsotsu no gyakusatsu hishi. Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1982.
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Fujioka and Yorii cases are good examples. On the conflict between the police
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For example, a contemporary newspaper article summarizes
the atmosphere of the vigilante violence at one scene:
Because we believed that they were the ones who
had killed our parents, children, wives and
brothers, and robbed my house and caused me so
much suffering, there could not be any peace . . .
crying out “kill and get rid of them”. . . the police
force could not interfere…. The people were
hungry for the blood of futei senjin…. No use even
if the victims were found to be Japanese….
Because of rampant cases of this sort, police had
Japanese wear hair bands as a sign for Japanese.80
Whether it was reflection or realization of the arbitrariness of such
differentiated corporeal discourse of Koreans, the police eventually
had to have Japanese wear hair bands as a sign for Japanese. If that
did not work either, the crowd would beat up and knock one down
until he or she groaned in their mother tongue, which “seemed to
work the best.”81
The power of the phantom images of futei senjin, which began
to penetrate the minds of the Japanese in the metropole following the
news of Korean resistance against the colonial masters since the early
twentieth century, continued to manifest in the cyclical violence
against Koreans in Japan. Some participated in the violence because
they uncritically accepted such images of “violent” Koreans. Others
An example is the Fukudamura case. See Fukudamura jiken no shinsō henshū
iinkai, ed. Fukudamura jiken no shinsō vols. 2 and 3. Chiba, Japan: Chibaken
fukudamura jiken shinsō chōsakai. 2002 and 2003.
79

Kahoku shinbun, September 7, 1923. Cited in Ch’oi, Sûng-man, I p’al tongnip sŏnŏn
kwa kwandong chinjae ŭi silsang kwa sajŏk ŭiŭi. (Seoul, 1984), 42.
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did so precisely because they “were well aware of the harsh treatment
of Koreans” 82 by Japanese and expected some kinds of counterviolence by the subjugated people.
The colonial structure of the empire and the reality of many
colonized people’s lives made the rumors all the more credible and
persuasive in the people’s minds back in the metropole. Furthermore,
once the vigilante activities began, the mob violence took on its own
life, disciplining the participants’ behaviors, if not their views on
Koreans. These accepted fear and rumors among Japanese reflect not
only the power of colonial representation, but also their
acknowledgement of the political-economic violence that was done
to Koreans. In a way, such recognition in the minds of Japanese
provided a stimulus in fictional narratives of a power inversion
between the victims and victimizers in the metropole. Thus, the
violence of colonialism became projected onto Korean bodies, easily
rendering the colonized subjects “imagined victimizers” through this
doubled projection of colonial violence. This phenomenon of the
Japanese massacre of futei senjin, which I call the imagined inversion of
colonial violence, effectively sheds light on the nature and the
mechanism of colonial violence, which is perpetuated cyclically not
only because of what “they” did or looked like, but because of what
“we” have done to them within the structure of racialized
imperialism.83
Nameless, Voiceless, Faceless Koreans: Futei Senjin in the
Colonial Archive
Following the 1923 massacre of Koreans, the term futei senjin was
censored in all publications, a ban which lasted about fifty days.
Upon realizing that things had gone too far with the rumors and that
82
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the rampant killing of Koreans had to stop, such censorship policy
was, in a way, an attempt to calm things down to reduce the harm
against the public order. Nonetheless, the authorities ultimately failed
to rectify the situation by acknowledging the government’s own
responsibility in proliferating the rumors and killing the Koreans by
using its military and police power while encouraging the rest of the
citizens to join them in their “self-defense.” Therefore, as in the case
of the ways in which the March First Movement was reported back in
the metropole as mob violence (bōdō), overall the fear of and the
images of violent and ungrateful futei senjin remained strong as the
rumors were considered at least partial truth with the existence of
such rioters. The alleged existence of the enemy within who were
rebelling against Japan and Japanese seemed to have provided a
powerful justification for massacring over six thousand Koreans both
in the case of the March First Movement and the Kantō Massacre of
Koreans. Thus, once the publication ban was lifted on October 20,
1923, the words futei senjin reappeared both in official and popular
discourses, and the believability of the “rumors” about Koreans was
never denied.84
On the same day when the Prime Minister announced his
appeal to exercise self-control and keep the nation’s peace, a secret
meeting was held at the Police Department of the Emergency
Earthquake Relief Bureau with representatives of the Army, Navy,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department,
and the Martial Law Command. They discussed strategies to
minimize domestic and international criticism of the Japanese
government’s responses to the rumors and the subsequent violence
in the metropole. The secret memorandum, “Chōsen mondai ni
kansuru kyōtei” [Accord regarding the Korean Problem] reads:
It is interesting to note that by the time of Pearl Harbor, the term futei was mostly
used to describe Japan’s most urgent enemies, Americans and British in newspapers.
84
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1. Each government official must do his best to
propagate the following as full fact and truth
concerning the Korean problem [senjin mondai]
in dealing with all domestic and international
sectors both now and in the future.
Accordingly,
a. Relay the following as facts to every
general government official and any
external sector;
b. Disseminate the following as a result of
factual investigation in dealing with
newspapers
Following:
“There were some instances and attempts of
violence by Koreans, but currently the
danger had completely passed. All the
general populace of Koreans are gentle and
obedient. Some small number of Koreans
suffered from persecution in the midst of
chaos, but many Japanese, too, suffered
from such persecution. Since all of this had
happened under a circumstance of confusion,
there was no massive persecution of
Koreans.”
2. Investigate and confirm the instances of
violence that Koreans committed or attempted to
commit following the points below:
a. Investigate thoroughly rumors against
Koreans and affirm those
as fact as much as possible;
b. Investigate thoroughly the basis of the
rumors;
c….
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d….
e….85
f. Look for effective measures to stop
Koreans and others from spreading
negative
publicity against Japan in Korea and Manchuria
wherever they reach whether it is Japan or
elsewhere.
g. Propagate, particularly overseas, that it was
the “Reds” among both
Japanese and Koreans who instigated the
unruly violence in the
background.86
The agreed policy of the authorities was also delivered to the
Governor-General of Korea, Saitō Makoto. Visiting Tokyo to deal
with the massacre of Koreans, Saitō appealed to the Japanese public
in a newspaper:
During this disaster there were rumors about
Koreans in the Tokyo-Yokohama area which
made people feel insecure. I feel very sorry and
cannot bear [this happening]. Among the large
number of Koreans there were, in fact, some
unruly ones; this I also regret. Those Koreans,
however, are only a small portion. I declare that
not all Koreans are unruly….87
85

Points c through e are missing or censored in the original document.

Kang and Kŭm, 80. Kang Tŏk-sang and Kŭm Pyŏng-dong revealed this secret
meeting record which became newly available in the process of opening the prewar
government documents in the 1960s. See the preface and introduction of Kang and
Kŭm, 1963 as well as the introduction in Kŭm, 1989.
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While appealing to the Japanese for their paternal “grace” for the
colonized for the sake of smooth rule over the colony, Saitō
confirmed the alleged crimes of Koreans following the government’s
decision at the secret meeting.
Maruyama Tsurukichi (1883-1956), a chief official in the
Governor-General’s Office under Saitō in Seoul and former Chief of
the Special Higher Police (tokkô), also confirmed the policy from the
imperial government in his dealing with the issue in Korea. He
harshly rebuked Koreans for their alleged insurrections during the
post-quake confusion as an unforgivable crime. He stated that the
riots of those pulryang chosŏnin (furyō chōsenjin; bad Koreans) seemed
clear from the result of thorough investigation of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department in the metropole. Maruyama
highlighted Koreans’ sins against the earthquake-stricken
metropolitan residents, and thus preemptively blocked any further
discussion or protest concerning the persecution of Koreans: they
deserve it, if not more.88 The same logic was also implemented to keep
the press from reporting on the persecution of Koreans by appealing
to their sympathy for the residents of the earthquake-stricken
metropole. In a threatening tone, Maruyama warned Koreans that
“the world would condemn Koreans as the cruelest people who did
the most inhumane thing to the disaster refugees,” and “Japanese—
with whom Koreans finally were able to make a desirable
relationship—would turn them down.”89
The results of the “thorough investigation,” as planned
according to the confidential accord of September 5, were announced
on October 21 the day after the press ban was lifted concerning
Koreans. It reported that the police filed charges against a total of
140 Korean suspects. However, a closer look reveals that eighty six
88
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percent of them were unknown, had run away, or died. For this
reason they had never been arrested, while of the remaining, sixteen
had been caught for stealing food and other property. According to
Yamada, between September and November of that year, there were
over 4,400 cases of such crimes under the extraneous circumstances
after the disaster. Only one person was charged for possible
insurrection because he possessed some explosive material.
Nevertheless, his motive of possessing the material was never
clarified, not to mention having no evidence of revolt or treason.90 In
the case of Yokohama, too, although there was a thorough
investigation, criminal charges were filed against a total of forty
Koreans or so, most of whom were never identified or apprehended.
Most of the cases against suspects, therefore, were dropped for lack
of evidence. 91 Above all, those futei senjin’s alleged crimes which
“caused” the initial rumors and killing, thus the Martial Law and the
preemptive mass killing, were never proved valid in any legal sense.
The massacre victims appeared nameless and voiceless in those police
reports, vigilante trial records, and even in their tomb stones for
those who were fortunate enough to have a tomb after being
massacred.
Perhaps it is not so surprising to see the result of sanitized
official records concerning the massacre of Koreans in the Japanese
archive. By definition, an archive refers to either a place in which
public records or historical documents are preserved, or the materials
themselves. The Latin root of archivum, stemming from the Greek
archeion embodies the meaning of a government house, rule, or the
government. Therefore, the term archive itself “reveals its proximity to
Ministry of Justice, “Shinsai go ni okeru keiji jihan oyobi soreni kanrenn suru jikô
chôsasho” [Reports concerning the criminal offenses and related matters after the
earthquake] 1923. Reprinted in Kang and Kŭm, 420-432; Yamada, 2003, 91-96.
90
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Weiner, 1989, 183.
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law, power, and rule—a connection that is obscured by the more
recent idea of the archive as a place for public use and scholarly
activity.”92 Unfortunately, the Korean archive, too, reveals the lack of
information on the event due to the censorship that existed under
Japanese rule as well as the lack of document preservation from the
colonial era. What is lost in this body of archival materials, then, are
the names, voices, and faces of the Korean massacre victims. Despite
some persistent demands for further investigation and a truthful
account of the violence from in and outside of the empire, the postmassacre responses of the government authorities remained minimal
without revealing the responsibility. As a result, there was a lack of
clarification while the images of the rumors and vigilante violence
were apparent and vivid.
Nevertheless, despite the general consensus on excusing the
vigilante violence and the imperial narrative control over the
meanings of the mayhem for the reconstruction of the imperial
metropolis, there remained various forms of records of the violence,
often accompanied by the critical voices toward the ruling authority
and in unexpected places.93 For example, following the rumors and
the mayhem, the school children expressed their fears and trauma
concerning the violence both allegedly done by Koreans and by their
own local vigilantes. Despite the fact that the main focus of the
exhibition remained on the continuing efforts for Japan’s
reconstruction after the quake, the children’s narratives and paintings
made an entry into the Tokyo Metropolitan Reconstruction Memorial
Hall. Their paintings in the Memorial Hall were submitted in
response to their teacher’s assignment to paint “the scariest thing at
Betty Joseph, Reading the East India Company, 1720-1840: Colonial Currencies of
Gender. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5.
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For Korean language source materials as well as some of the key nonconventional archival source materials concerning the Kantō Massacre, see ch. 5 in
Lee, 2004.
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the time of the earthquake.” Matsuyama Tatsuo, a ten year-old boy
from one of the most devastated areas in Tokyo, drew the armed
police officers in white summer uniforms and the soldiers in khaki
uniforms, who were checking on the passers-by one by one. These
scenes of “hunting Koreans” (Chōsenjin gari) were some of the scariest
moments in the eyes of children at the time of the earthquake and the
aftermath, and Koreans in their contemporary writings, such as
diaries or school essay assignments, appear mostly as Senjin or
Chōsenjin [Figures 1-5].
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Figure 1. Matsuyama Tatsuo (Honyoko Elementary School), Check
Points for the Passers-by. Crayon. Original housed in the Reconstruction
Memorial Hall(Fukkō Kinenkan), Tokyo.
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Figure 2. Collection of children’s drawings for the first anniversary of
the Great Kantō Earthquake (Sakamoto Elementary School, Tokyo.
Original housed in the Reconstruction Memorial Hall, Tokyo.
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Figure 3. The soldier and night time patrol by a vigilante. Collection of
children’s drawings for the first anniversary of the Great Kantō
Earthquake (Sakamoto Elementary School, Tokyo). Original housed
in the Reconstruction Memorial Hall, Tokyo.
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Figures 4-5. Collection of children’s earthquake memoirs. Yokogawa
Normal Elementary School. Original housed in the Reconstruction
Memorial Hall, Tokyo.
The violence was too vivid to be ignored, not only by the
children but also by artists who survived and witnessed both the
natural and manmade disasters. While photographs or printed
matters were strictly censored avoiding mentioning of the massacre
of Koreans, individual drawings and paintings were easier to create
and preserve once artists decided to capture what they had seen in
the form of drawings or paintings. These visual records include a
contemporary entrepreneur’s picture scroll which recorded a scene of
the harassment of Koreans as futei senjin. The text tells the content of
the rumors and the violent reaction to the alleged futei senjin by the
171
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Japanese citizens. It shows the direct involvement of police as well as
a citizen in cracking on Koreans (in white summer uniforms). There
are five passers-by who must have been witnesses of the scene. One
wonders where the police force is dragging the four Koreans whose
faces are intentionally left blank. [Figure 6].

Figure 6. A contemporary Japanese entrepreneur’s picture scroll of
the 1923 Earthquake.
Original housed in the National Museum of Japanese History, Japan.
Finally, there are extraordinary multiple sets of picture scroll
by a young artist, Kayahara Hakudō (1896-1951). He was originally
from Chiba Prefecture and when the earthquake took place he was
training as a traditional Japanese painting (Nihonga) artist at his
mentor’s mansion located in the Shinjuku area. He narrates the story
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of the earthquake followed by the post-quake massacre of Koreans
[Figures 7-8]. Entitled Tōto daishinsai kaganroku (The Visual Records
of the Great Earthquake in Eastern Capital), the scrolls include the
scenes of the persecution of Koreans by war veterans, police, and
numerous Japanese mobs in Kōtōku district in Tokyo. Tada
Toshitsuka, an antiques and arts dealer in Osaka, discovered one of
the first picture scrolls on the earthquake by Hakudō in the midst of
another devastating earthquake in the Hansin-Kobe area in 1996. The
scenes portray the armed people arresting and killing the Korean
victims as if one can almost hear the sound of the mobs. Hakudō
worked on these grand scale picture scroll set between the time of the
earthquake in September and finished the three volume set by
December of 1923, which is in the Hakudō family’s possession. The
artist also worked on at least another three volume set sometime
before February 1925, which is now housed in the National Museum
of Japanese History, Chiba. The vol. 3 of this later set was discovered
in the Kobe area in western Japan, and had been in display at the
Ōsaka Museum of Human Rights as soon as the scroll was
discovered in January.94 Here, the people are portrayed more or less
as a mass, both the victims and victimizers. However, the Korean
dresses that the two victims are wearing on their way to the place of
their final persecution seem to suggest that the artist was making a
point about the victims’ identity—however voiceless they appear.

For further discussion on the discovery process of the scrolls, see Nakama Keiko,
“kakareta Chōsenjin gyakusatsu to sakusha Kayahara Hakudō, Kantō daishinsai emaki
kara miete kita koto,” Osaka jinken hakubutsukan kiyo 1997 and also Lee, 2013.
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Figure 7. Kayahara Hakudō, Visual Records of the Great Earthquake in
Eastern Capital (Tôto daishinsai kaganroku). Picture scroll vol. 3. Private
Collection of Hakudō family.
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Figure 8. Kayahara Hakudō, Visual Records of the Great Earthquake in
Eastern Capital (Tôto daishinsai kaganroku). Picture scroll vol. 3. Original
housed in the National Museum of Japanese History, Chiba, Japan.
These visual texts, in one way or another, indicate the
significance of these artists’ experience of the massacre of Koreans
weighed heavily in their minds. They also demonstrate the close
involvement of the soldiers, police, war veterans, and local fire
brigades and other vigilante members in the massacre of alleged futei
senjin. These actors were often identified by their uniforms and other
clothes. While the Koreans still seem to remain largely nameless,
faceless, and voiceless in these depictions, at least their existence in
these visual records indicate the clear presence of the massacre
memory in the minds of those who experienced the violence. Indeed,
the Japanese state worked so hard and meticulously to argue that it
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was the vigilantes who carried out the massacre and not the
government. Yet, thanks to accumulated research in the post-war era,
as well as these glimpses of the trace of the alleged futei senjin in the
materials outside the conventional archive, we now know that the
massacre itself cannot be denied, along with the government’s
responsibility. 95 Indeed, throughout the postwar era, the Japanese
grassroot movement rose up to address this issue of the nameless,
faceless, voiceless Korean massacre victims, confronting the deniers
of the Kantō massacre of colonized Koreans.96
Conclusion
The colonial rhetoric of assimilation was at odds with the efforts to
differentiate Koreans from Japanese physically and culturally. Such
efforts to produce a colonial taxonomy of the invisible enemy within,
in turn, concretized what it meant to be “Japanese” and where to
draw the boundary of the “Japanese public” in the reality of the
multiethnic modern empire. Ironically, further assimilation efforts
and the rhetoric of inclusive politics proliferated while categorizing
Koreans in a new “scientific” language of racism, ethnology,
ethnography, eugenics, criminology, and medicine. 97 Despite the
For example, for the evidence of the military involvement in the massacre, see
Matsuo Matsuo Shōichi, ed. Kantō daishinsai seifu riku kaigun kankei shiryō. 3 vols.
(Tokyo, 1997). For the evidence of the government authorities‘ involvement, see
Kŭm Pyŏng-dong ed., Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren kanchō shiryō (Tokyo, 1991).
96 For instance, see the introduction to these citizens’ volunteer organizations to
bring justice to the massacre victims and their descendants in their commemoration
publications, including Kantō daishinsai kinen gyōji jikkō iinnkai, ed., 1993 and
2003.
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For example, see GGK, Chōsenjin no shishō to seikaku, 1927; On the development
of ethnology in the Japanese empire, Kevin M. Doak, “What Is a Nation and Who
Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century
Japan.” American Historical Review 102:2 (1997), 283-309; On eugenics and sexology,
Sabina Frühsück, Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan (Berkeley,
CA, 2003).
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frequent contradictions in the descriptions of their “unique” physical
and cultural features as well as the irony in these mechanisms of the
inclusion and exclusion of the empire, such rhetoric justified Japan’s
continuing rule over Korea by making use of colonial representations
of the subjugated people as “petty” yet gravely “political,” therefore,
futei. The government’s efforts in “scientific” research on the features
of the colonized people were justified for the sake of improving the
national character of the Korean race, which had potential to be
assimilated to Japanese, as Japan belonged to the “honorary white
race” due to its accomplishments and attributes in joining the
imperial club of world empires. 98 Such colonial knowledge was
utilized for the spider-web like network of police surveillance used to
capture the anti-Japanese and therefore “dangerous” futei senjin.
The concentrated efforts and unsuccessful attempts to
differentiate Korean bodies from Japanese revealed the dilemma that
imperialism brought not only to the colony, but also back home in
the metropole. The increasing invisibility of the colonized Others in
the metropole intensified colonial anxiety among the authorities and
the Japanese public alike. In addition, such images of violent and
dangerous Koreans became intensified, especially going through the
crisis moments in Japan’s rule over its resistant colonial subjects. 99

The Japanese Adam Smtih, Taguchi Ukichi, for example, famously argued that
the Japanese is not “yellow” race, but “white” because Japan’s achievements in the
early twentieth century does not correspond to the attributes given to the yellow
race. Thus he suggested further social engineering to reveal the inherent
“whiteness” of modern Japanese. This is a classic example which reveals the
predicament of the problematic racial taxonomy and uncritical acceptance of such
in the spread of the modern empires. I would like to thank Leo Ching for bringing
this point to my attention.
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For example, in addition to various problems in the history textbook description
concerning the 1923 massacre of Koreans which still obfuscate the historical truth
and the issue of responsibility, the discussion of sangokujin (the third nationals) and
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The killing of imagined and alleged futei senjin was justified with
impunity, as in the case of the government rhetoric following the
massacre of Koreans both in 1919 and in 1923. Although the detailed
methods vary, the same logic still permeates today’s political
controversies over the issue of the Kantō Massacre. For example, a
pogrom can be excused because there were futei senjin, Kudō Miyoko
argues; the Kantō massacre by the state and the people is justified
since it was a self-defense measure against terrorists and rebels
against Japan.100 Another example of the continuing legacies of the
obfuscated truth concerning the colonial violence against futei senjin
includes a controversy over the Tokyo metropolitan school district’s
high school textbook revision concerning the Kantō Massacre. As of
January 2013, that the education committee of Tokyo removed the
word “massacre” in the description of an epithet dedicated to the
Korean massacre victims in Yokoami Park in Tokyo was discovered
because they believe what happened to those futei senjin is different
from what “massacre” means.101
As Japan today strives to focus on its recovery from the
devastating Great East Japan Earthquake two years ago, the tragedy
of those who were persecuted in the name of futei senjin might have
been forgotten in the midst of post-quake “reconstruction” campaign.
However, as we commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the Great
Kantō Earthquake this year, there seem to be some important lessons
we can take from the post-Kantō earthquake situation. Fear,
imagination, and sense of shame can work powerfully in the minds of
kenkanron (Korea bashing discourse) as well as the negative images attached to
zainichi Koreans continue to reveal the fear of the subversive Koreans in postwar
Japan testifying the long lasting legacies of imperialism and colonialism in the
contemporary era.
100

Kudō Miyoko, Kanto daishinsai : Chōsenjin gyakusatsu no shinjitsu (Tokyo, 2009).
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Asahi Shinbun, January 25, 2013.
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the people who lived through the traumatic natural and man-made
disasters, and these same affects can drive us to different ways of
thoughts and actions from ninety years ago. So, how are we to
understand the meanings and lessons from the disasters from the
past for today? How responsibly can one share and read the
information in and beyond the archives under the influence of
colonialism and imperialism? What are the colonial legacies in the
culture of the post-colonial era, and how can we fight against its
continuing influence in our ways of thinking and living? How can we
assure that reconstruction without reflection is a path to destruction?
The question of Fanon certainly remains true to many Koreans and
Japanese today: “colonialism is fighting…to maintain the identity of
the image it has of the Algerian and the depreciated image that the
Algerian has of himself….” 102 Now, what kind of images do
Tokyoites want from their past, to whom and for what kind of
future?

Franz Fanon, Studies in a Dying Colonialism, (New York, 1970 [originally 1959]),
30.
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